The main aim of the article is to contribute to the bourgeoning debate on semipresidentialism, its definition, and its characteristic features, with analysis of the empirical example of the Czech Republic, a country which, according to Elgie´s standard definition, shifted to semi-presidentialism in 2012. The author investigates whether and how Miloš Zeman, the first directly elected president of the Czech Republic, influences relations among the key political institutions in the direction of the model of a semi-presidential democracy. 
INTRODUCTION
The concept of semi-presidentialism is by far the most frequently discussed part of what Cheibub calls "the most influential tripartite distinction" including parliamentary and presidential democracies.
1 There are two basic reasons for this. Havel and Václav Klaus, Zeman is the third strong political personality willing to leave a visible imprint on the functioning of the office and someone who is "a usual suspect" in terms of attempts to increase the political role of the president to the detriment of constitutional conventions established during the previous two decades of the development of the Czech political system.
The main aim of the article is to discuss the importance of formal and informal factors in the definition of a semi-presidential political system. The second aim of the paper is to assess whether the Czech Republic is undergoing a change of political system from a parliamentary to a semi-presidential model of democracy.
To achieve the aforementioned goals, the paper will proceed as follows. First, the debate on the concept of semi-presidential political systems must be addressed in order to demonstrate a certain plurality of approaches to defining the basic features of such a regime. Next the article discusses the influences of the 
THE CONCEPT OF SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM AS A PART OF THE PROBLEM
The concept of semi-presidentialism was born shortly after the consolidation of the political system of the Fifth French Republic. We have to also consult the volume edited by Robert Elgie and Sophia Moestrup 9 devoted solely to the phenomenon of mezzo regimes in post-communist countries. In the volume, the ambiguous nature of semi-presidentialism in the above-presented definition is, however, shown by case studies as well as in the distinction between "highly presidentialised semi-presidentialism and the balanced presidential-prime ministerial semi-presidentialism" as two facets of a semipresidential system. The authors are absolutely right in showing that the neither "pure" parliamentary democracy nor "pure" presidential systems encompass the whole reality of post-communist institutional choices. However, the concept is stretched too much to go into the matter further. 14 I owe thanks for inspiration to the interesting paper of André Krouwel, supra note 11: 4-5, who defined the semi-presidential system among other features by the fact that the president in such a system has "substantive executive prerogatives" but the governmental power still prevails. Giovanni ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 7, NUMBER 2 2014
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power is written into the constitution; but, we have to analyse relations between the president and the government in the period of government creation, personnel changes in its composition and in the moment of drafting or modifying the crucial points of the governmental agenda. We are aware of the limits of such an incremental approach based on a single case study and we are perfectly understand the limits of this working definition for any kind of generalization. However, the combination of research methods described in the following part and this working definition creates a credible and heuristically sound framework for the case study of the Czech Republic after the first direct election of the head of state.
Such a working concept does not entirely put aside problems related to the former Duverger definition. The notion of "real impact on composition of government and its agenda" is only a bit clearer than "considerable powers". Still, to operationalize "real impact" is easier than "considerable powers" since we do know what kind of powers and activities are considered as the most important for building the president's position in the political system. To achieve the "real power", a president must have:
(1) formal power to nominate and dismiss the government, (2) formal or informal influence on the process of government composition (directly or indirectly via consultations with a designated prime minister), and (3) formal or informal impact on the agenda of the government.
DATA AND METHODS
The following analysis provides a qualitative single case study of the Czech The case study has the potential to be used as arguments for a broader discussion on semi-presidentialism as a distinctive type of political system. However, the this article's comparative ambitions are only of secondary importance. 16 Sartori (supra note 11, p. 132) prefers to talk about "dual authority structure" within the executive body. 15 At the beginning of 2012, Zeman confirmed that he would be a candidate for Czech president. In March 2014, his first year in office was completed. 16 In order to analyse these events, the methodological tool used here is the process tracing method, which aims at showing causal mechanisms of analysed processes. 17 As we understand the entire activity of Zeman in the office of President as a process with still unclear results (continuity of a parliamentary system or semipresidential turn) we cannot apply the methods of process tracing strictly. We can however draw inspiration from this method in the sense that we need to analyse carefully any event we take into consideration and look especially for the outcome 17 
THE ROLE OF THE CZECH POLITICAL TRADITION
To European integration (such as the process of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty etc.). 20 On the other hand, Klaus was more self-restrained in relation to processes of government formation compared to Havel's effort to influence the composition and agenda of the cabinet.
Generally however, both Havel and Klaus tried to play an active role and to conceptualize the position of president as a strong political institution with a high level of symbolic as well as some level of real political power. They basically succeeded in the long term perspective to maintain the high status of the office in public eyes. 21 A combination of this heritage and the direct method of election almost certainly could have paved the way for a semi-presidential turn.
A CONSTITUTIONAL DEFINITION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE -A TEXT WITH POLYSEMOUS CONNOTATIONS
The Schwarzenberg, who clearly stated that these two people were not professional diplomats and he would never nominate them. 27 The dispute over these two persons expanded soon to a general "war" between Zeman and Schwarzenberg that practically paralysed the process of ambassador circulation including some political nominations in favour of people close to government parties. Schwarzenberg refused to nominate Klausová and Remek and Zeman refused to appoint any other candidate. Both parts of the dispute used arguments by which the adversary 24 Jan Kysela and Zdeněk Kühn, supra note 20. 25 Such flexibility was used as powerful rhetorical device by Zeman as well. Commenting upon the fact that many of routines of behaviour of the Czech head of state is not fixed by constitution but by constitutional conventions, Zeman said: "Above all I would like to say that the notion of a constitutional convention is completely idiotic because in the case that it was a constitutional convention, it would be anchored in the constitution in some way. These are nothing more than conventions. The president, albeit directly elected, cannot change the constitution but he has of course sovereign right to change the conventions that are not anchored in the constitution" (Právo (July 11, 2013) // http://www.zemanmilos.cz/cz/clanky/----rozhovor-prezidenta-republiky-pro-denik-pravo.htm). 26 Livia Klausová criticized the wife of Karel Schwarzenberg for the sake of her Austrian nationality and for the fact that she does not speak Czech which fostered a lot of chauvinistic argument against Schwarzenberg as a candidate not patriotic enough and obliged to serve foreign interests. 27 The president can appoint only the people who are nominated by the MFA. The vote of confidence on August 7, 2013, was a failure for Rusnok. 93 deputies supported the cabinet, 100 deputies voted against it. After two weeks, the house of deputies decided on its dissolution and opened the way for early election.
Zeman authorised Rusnok's cabinet to continue its executive functions until the 31 The Public Affairs Party was a minor protest party which became a member of Nečas's coalition government until the party split into two factions. The Public Affairs party left the coalition and tried to become closer to President Klaus and later on even to Zeman, without success in either case. Zeman denied any connection, saying that he was only fulfilling one of his promises to be in direct and frequent contact with the people in the regions. 40 Some quarter of a year after the Lány Meeting, Zeman described the session as being organized by Hašek and that the content of debate was related to Zeman's 69 th birthday and to the bad electoral returns of the Social Democratic Party which obtained only slightly more than 20 per cent of the vote (according to some earlier pre-election polls, the party could count even on 30 per cent). 41 Lánská schůzka připravila Zemana o popularitu, Hospodářské noviny (December 3, 2013) // http://archiv.ihned.cz/c1-61378160-lanska-schuzka-pripravila-zemana-o-popularitu.
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As you know well, the government is appointed by the president according to the proposal of the prime minister. As far as the word proposal is concerned, it has an absolutely clear meaning in the colloquial Czech language. The proposal is not something you must accept automatically. In the case it was so, it would have interesting consequences for commercial as well as for marital relations.
42
Zeman's rhetoric concerning candidates with a given lack of expertise was again very strong; however, the result was zero. The real process of government composition remained in the hands of the coalition parties and prime minister Sobotka. Zeman's ironical remarks about him and some parts of the governmental program declaration could hardly disguise the fact that Zeman had lost again.
Zeman was not the first to demonstrate a tendency to block the nomination of Without strong allies, encircled by adversarial attitudes on forming the new coalition cabinet, and facing a decline of popularity, Zeman tacitly decided to abandon the strategy of accruing personal power, at least for the time being.
42 Press conference (January 10, 2014) // http://www.zemanmilos.cz/cz/clanky/tiskova-konferenceprezidenta-republiky.htm.
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CONCLUSION
The main aim of the paper was to discuss the importance of formal and informal factors in the definition of a semi-presidential political system. The second aim of the paper was to assess whether the Czech Republic is undergoing a change of political system from a parliamentary to a semi-presidential model of democracy.
We can conclude from the analysis of Zeman's first year of political activities that all his attempts failed so far, and despite Zeman's rhetorical strength, the other political actors developed successful strategies to defend their powers and prerogatives. In the medium term perspective, Zeman failed to build his power base on Rusnok and the "Zemanites". However, if one looks back at the period of 
